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sceptical method is advancing too rapidly, and who would impose upon it a wholesome restraint. For, just as in the field of battle a thorough knowledge of the enemy's position, force, and movements is of the highest possible value, so in the field of philosophy, in its broad, practical developments, the secret of successful logic lies in the power to impress the contestant with a complete mastery of his side of the controversy as well as one's own. This power, of all logicians, Kant most pre-eminently revealed, even pointing out to his opponents elements of strength and grounds of justification which they in their blind zeal had only intuitively perceived, if at all. And there can be no doubt that science and rational philosophy would not only welcome a contest of this enlightened kind, but would seek to profit by it, as they profit by every means of advancing the cause of truth in the world.

GOD AS THE ETERNALLY BEGOTTEN SON.

TRANSLATED FROM THE THIRD PART OF HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION" BY F. LOUIS SOLDAN.

II.—*The Eternal Idea of God in the Element of Consciousness and Image-Concept, or, the Difference, the Realm of the Son.*

This idea must here be considered as it steps from its universality and infinitude into the category of finiteness. God is present everywhere; the presence of God is this very truth which is in everything.

The idea was at first in the element of thinking. This is the basis, and we began with it. The universal, and, therefore, the more abstract, element must precede in science. In the category of science it is the first; in [the category of] existence, it is a later element; it is being-in-itself [potentiality], but it appears later in cognition; it arrives at consciousness and cognition, later.

The form of the idea attains phenomenal existence as a result, which, however, is essentially being-in-itself. The content of the idea is so constituted that what is last is first, and what is first is last, and, in a like manner, that which appears as a result is

[also] presupposition, being-in-itself [potentiality], and basis. This idea must now be considered in its second element—in the element of phenomenality. The absolute idea, as objectivity, or in itself, is complete, but not so the subjective side; neither in itself as such, nor the subjectivity in the divine idea as for itself. We can look upon this process from two sides.

The first is: The subject for which this idea has existence is the thinking subject. The forms of image-conception do not alter the nature of the fundamental form; they do not prevent this form from existing for man as a thinking being. The activity of the subject is that of thinking; it thinks this idea; but the subject is [also] concrete self-consciousness, and hence this idea must exist for the subject as concrete self-consciousness, as a real subject.

Or: This idea is the absolute truth; the latter is for [= is cognized by] the thinking faculty; but for the subject the idea must exist not only as a truth, but the subject must also have the certitude of the idea—*i. e.*, the certainty which belongs to this subject as such; that is to say, belongs to him as to a finite, empirically concrete, sensuous subject.

The idea exists as certitude for the subject, and the subject is certain of it only in so far as the idea is perceptible. The idea has certainty as far as it *is* for the subject. That of which I can say: This is, has certainty for myself, it is immediate cognition, it is certitude. The further mediation consists in proving that that which is, is at the same time necessary, and that that which is certain is true. Such proof forms the transition to the universal.

Having begun with the form of truth, we must now proceed to the phase in which this form receives certainty, or that it is for myself.

The other mode of proceeding is to begin with the side of the idea.

1. It is [the nature of] Being to be eternally in and for itself, to unfold itself, to determine itself, to evolve subject and object, and to posit itself as its own difference: the difference, however, is in the same process eternally cancelled; the being that is in and for itself [potential and actualized being] eternally returns into itself in this process, and only in so far as it does this it is spirit.

To the differentiated element attaches the determination, that

the difference has vanished immediately, and that this [process] is nought but a relation of God, or of the idea to itself. This differentiation is but a movement; it is love's play with itself, and does not amount to serious alienation, to separation and diremption.

The alien or other is determined as Son. In the form of senti-
ment it is love, in a higher category it is spirit, in-itself and free. Within the idea the category of difference is not yet completed with this determination; it is only the abstract difference in general, and we have not yet reached the difference in its peculiarity; the difference is only *one* determination.

We may say, for this reason, that we have not yet arrived at the difference. The differentiated things are posited as the same; the phase has not yet been reached in which the differentiated ones have different predicates. On this side the diremption of the idea should be so understood that the Son receives the predication of otherness [or alienation] as such, and that he is free, for himself, that he appears [phenomenally] as a reality, outside and without God, as something that is.

His ideality, his eternal return[ing] into that which is in-and-for-itself, is posited as immediately identical in the first idea. In order that the difference may be, and receive its due, alienation is necessary; the differentiated thing must be alienation which possesses Being.

The absolute idea alone determines itself, and, in determining itself, is absolutely free and secure in itself; it is this in determining itself to send out this its determination as something free, so that it be an independence, an independent object. What is free exists only for what is free itself; for the free man alone is another man free.

It is the absolute freedom of the idea that in its determinations, and in its diremption as subject and object, sends forth [its] other as free and independent. This other sent forth as something independent, is the world in general. The absolute diremption into subject and object which gives independence to the side of alienation, may be called Goodness; it lends to this side, in its alienation, the whole idea to the extent and in the manner in which it can embody this idea in itself and can represent it.

2. The truth of the world is only its ideality; it has no true reality; it is its nature to be, but it is only to be something ideal,

and not to be something eternal in itself; it is to be a created thing; its being is posited being only.

The nature of the being of the world is that it has an element of being, but that it cancels this separation or alienation from God and is nothing but there turn to its origin, and thus it enters into the relation of spirit, and of love.

This is the process of the world, by which it passes over from the fallen state, from separation, to reconciliation. The first element in the idea is only the relation of father and son, but the other receives also the predicate of alienation, or otherness; that of being.

It is in the Son, in the category of difference, that the further determination proceeds to the next differentiation by which the difference receives what is due to it—namely, the right of being different. Jacob Boehme expressed this transition in the phase of the Son thus: That the first only begotten one was Lucifer, the bearer of light, the bright, clear principle, but that he “imagined” himself into himself—*i. e.*, that he posited himself for himself, and proceeded to being; that he thus fell away, but that the eternally only begotten one was immediately posited in his place.

From the first stand-point the nature of this relation is, that God exists in his eternal truth, and that this state is thought as being before time, as the state in which it existed when the blessed spirits, the stars of morning, and the angels, His children, praised God. This relation is thus expressed as a state, but it is the eternal relation of thinking to the object. Later, it is said a fall took place; this is the positing of the second stand-point; on one side it is the analysis of the Son, the sundering of the two phases contained in him. The other side, however, is the subjective consciousness—the finite spirit—[which knows] that this, as pure thinking is in itself the process, that it started with the immediate and elevated itself to truth. This is the second form.

Thus we enter the sphere of determination in space and the world of finite spirit. This must now be expressed more particularly as the positing of predication, as a momentarily held or sustained difference; it is God coming forth and becoming phenomenal in finiteness; for finiteness is properly the separation of what is identical in itself, but is conceived and apprehended in separation. On the other side, on that of subjective spirit, this is posited

as pure thinking; but in itself it is a result, and this must be posited as it is in itself as this movement. The pure thinking has to return into itself, and by this alone it posits itself as finite.

Considering it from this stand-point, the other or alien is not conceived as the Son, but as the external world, as the finite world which is outside of truth, which is the world of finiteness, and where the Other has the form of Being, while, nevertheless, according to its nature, it is only the *ēreporv*, determined, differentiated, limited, and negative.

The relation of this second sphere to the first is thereby determined in this way, that it is the same idea in-itself, but in this other category; the absolute act of the first diremption is in itself the same as the second one; image-conception alone holds these two apart as two totally different grounds and *actus*.

In fact, they ought to be distinguished and held apart; and if it has been said that they are the same in themselves, it must be strictly defined how this is to be understood lest there might arise the false meaning and erroneous conception as if the eternal Son of the Father, the Son of the deity which is object to itself, were the same as the world, and as if under the former we understood the latter.

We have said, however, and, indeed, it is self-evident, that only the idea of God, as explained above in what was called the first sphere, is the eternal, true God; and then, also, his realization and manifestation in the explicit and full process of spirit, which will be considered in the third sphere.

If the world, as it is immediately, should be taken as being in-and-for-itself, if what is sensuous and temporal were taken as Being, either that false meaning would be attached to it ["that the Son and the world be the same"], or it would be necessary to assume two eternal ACTUS of God. God's activity, however, is always purely one and the same, and not a variety of distinct activities, not a Now and Then, a Separation, etc.

As it is, this distinction of independent being is nothing but the phase, negative for itself, or otherness, or of extraneousness, which, as such, has no truth, but is only a phase, and, according to time, it is only a moment, and not even a moment, since it has this mode of independence only for the finite spirit, because the latter itself in its existence has only this manner and mode of independence.

In God himself this [quality of] being now and for-itself is nought but the vanishing element of phenomenality.

It is true that this phase has the width, breadth, and depth of a world, that it is heaven and earth, and is their organization infinite within and without. If we say that this other is only a vanishing phase, that it is only the flash of the lightning which in the phenomenon disappears immediately, or that it is the sound of a word which, in being spoken and heard, disappears as far as its external existence is concerned: In these momentary phenomena we are apt to see too much the transitory element of time with its before and after, but it *is* neither in the one nor in the other. Every predication of time must be kept out, be it that of duration or of the Now [= present], and we must hold fast the simple thought of the Other or Alien, the *simple* thought, for the Other or Alien is an abstraction. That this abstraction is expanded into a world in time and space, rests on this, that it is the simple phase of the idea itself, and that it therefore receives the latter entire in itself; but, since it is the phase of otherness, it is the immediate, sensuous expansion.

Questions like the one: Whether the world, or matter, is from eternity, or has a beginning in time, belong to the empty metaphysics of the understanding. In the phrase, "From eternity," eternity itself is only an image-perception of infinite time; it is represented as defective infinity; it is nothing but the infinity of reflection, and belongs to its category. The world is properly the region of contradiction, and in it the idea is in a category that is inadequate to it. Whenever the world is the object of the faculty of image-conception, the element of time, and, by reflection, also that [conception] of eternity arise, we must remember, however, that this predication does not concern the idea itself.

There is another question, or, partly, another side of the former question; the world, since it is said to be from eternity, is un-created, and is immediately for itself. The distinction which the understanding makes between form and matter underlies this question; but matter and world are, on the contrary, according to their fundamental determination, rather this Other, the negative which is in itself but a phase of posited being. This is the opposite of independence, and the nature of its existence is to cancel itself and to be a phase of the process. The natural world is rela-

tive, it is a phenomenon—*i. e.*, it is so, not only for us, but it is so in itself, and it is its quality to be in transition and to betake itself back into the last idea. The various metaphysical determinations of the *ōλη*, which we find with the ancient as well as the Christian philosophers, especially the Gnostics, have their basis in the category of the independence of otherness.

It is by reason of the otherness of the world that it is simply the created thing, and is not a world that has being in-and-for-itself. If the distinction is made of a Beginning, as the creation, and the preservation of what exists, it is because image-conception assumes that such a sensuous world really exists and has being. It has, therefore, been stated very properly at all times, that since being and self-existing independence are not attributes of the world, preservation is creation. It might be said that creation is also preservation; this would be said for the reason that the phase of otherness is itself a phase of the idea; that is to say, the presupposition would exist, as mentioned before, that being preceded creation.

Since otherness is now determined and predicated as the totality of phenomenality, it expresses in itself the idea, and this is in general what has been designated as the wisdom of God. Wisdom, however, is yet a general expression, and it is the province of philosophic cognition to cognize this concept in nature, to comprehend it as a system in which the divine idea mirrors itself. The latter, then, is manifested, but its content is the manifestation itself, to distinguish itself as an Other and to take this back into the former, so that this return is just as much a Without as a Within. In nature these stages lie outside of each other as a system of the kingdoms of nature, of which the highest is the kingdom of living creatures.

It is, however, the nature of life, which is the highest representation of the idea in nature, to sacrifice itself (this is the negativity of the idea turned against this, its existence), and to become spirit. Spirit is [this progression] this stepping forth by means of nature—*i. e.*, it has in nature its antithesis, by whose annulment it is for itself, and is spirit.

The finite world is the side of difference as distinguished from the side which remains in its unity. Thus it divides itself into the natural world and the world of the finite spirit. Nature does

not enter for itself into relationship to God; it enters into such relationship only in its relation to man. For nature is not cognition; God is spirit, and nature knows nothing of spirit.

It is created by God, but it does not enter from itself into relationship to God, inasmuch as it is not a cognizing agent. It stands in relation to man only, and in this relation to man it constitutes what is called the side of his dependence.

Inasmuch as it is cognized by thinking, cognized as created by God, and as containing reason, understanding, it is known by thinking man. It is in so far placed into relationship to the Divine as its truth is cognized.

The manifold forms of the relationship of the finite spirit to nature can find no place here; their scientific treatment belongs to the phenomenology, or philosophy of spirit. Here we must consider this relationship within the sphere of religion, so that nature is for man not only this external, immediate world, but a world in which man cognizes God; nature is thus for man a revelation of God. This relation of spirit to nature we have seen previously, in the ethnic religions where we considered the forms through which spirit ascended from the immediate—where nature is taken as contingent—to the [form of] necessity, and to the form of an agency which is wise, and acts conformably to a purpose. Thus, the finite spirit's consciousness of God is mediated by nature. Man sees God through nature; nature remains but the investment and untrue form.

That which is differentiated from God is here really another, and has the form of an Other; it is nature which is for God and for man. By this means the unity is to be consummated, and the consciousness is to be brought about, that conciliation is the end, aim, and category of religion. The first [stage] is the abstract consciousness that there is a God, that man rises from nature to God; this we have seen in the proofs of the existence of God. To this [stage] belong the pious contemplations, How magnificently God has made everything! how wisely he has arranged everything! These elevating contemplations proceed directly to God, with whatever point of the subject-matter they begin. Piety institutes such edifying contemplations; it begins with the most particular and the lowest, and cognizes therein, in general, something higher. Very frequently there is mingled with this the

distorted view that what occurs in nature is looked upon as something higher than what is simply human. This contemplation itself, since it begins with the singular or particular, is inadequate. Another consideration may be opposed to it. The cause should correspond to the phenomenon; it should itself contain the limitation which the phenomenon has in it; we demand the special reason which has caused this particular. The contemplation of any particular phenomenon contains always this inadequate element. These particular phenomena, besides, are natural ones; but God is to be comprehended as spirit, and, therefore, that in which we cognize him must, therefore, be something spiritual. "God thunders with his thunder, they say, and still he is not known;" spiritual man demands something higher than the merely natural. In order to be known as spirit, God must do more than thunder.

The higher contemplation of nature and the deeper relation to God, in which it is to be placed, consists rather in that it is itself conceived as something spiritual—*i. e.*, as the naturalness of man. Only when the subject is no more directed towards the immediate being of the natural, but is posited as what it is in itself, namely, as movement, and only when it has gone into itself—then only finiteness as such is posited. It is then posited as finiteness in the process of that relation in which it feels the need and want of the absolute idea, and in which the phenomenon of the latter arises. Here the first is the need and want of truth, and the second the manner and mode of the manifestation of truth.

The need and want, in the first place, presuppose that there exists in the subjective spirit the demand to cognize the absolute truth. This need implies immediately that the subject is in a state of untruth but the subject, as spirit stands above this, its own untruth, and for this reason this untruth is an element which must be conquered.

This state of untruth may be more explicitly stated as the subject in disunion with itself; the need finds expression in the demand that this disunion be cancelled in the subject, and this demand implies that it be cancelled by truth. The demand means that the subject be reconciled, and this can only be the reconciliation with truth.

This is the special form of the need; the characteristic is this,

that the disunion or diremption is in the subject in general, and that the subject is evil, that it is diremption in itself. The subject is contradiction; not the contradiction which is merely disconnecting, but that which also holds together; and it is by this means only that the subject is disunited as a contradiction within itself.

FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE: KANT'S REFUTATION OF THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF OF THE BEING OF GOD.

By W. T. HARRIS.¹

In the history of philosophy we have a record of the discovery and exposition of a series of deep insights. The mastery of these insights is a sort of ascent of the individual into the insight of his race—and not the acquirement of mere information regarding the opinions of his fellow-men.

The constant lesson of social science is the dependence of the individual upon the aid of the community for the supply of his wants of food, clothing, and shelter. The dependence of the individual upon the race in spiritual matters of knowledge and wisdom is more wonderful. The science of nature and mind rests upon a vast mass of experience made up of the collected observations of mankind. Not merely the data of observation are included in this mass of experience, but the results of reflection on those data. Reflection concentrates experience, reduces it to unity. Each principle stands for many facts. The results of reflection are stated in the form of generalized principles and expressed in technical terms.

By availing one's self of these results of reflection, he can traverse the field of experience of the race in a very short time and arrive at the view of the world which the individual could not reach unaided, but the social whole of man has attained.

Without participating in the results of the reflection of his race, it would avail little that the individual could assist his own

¹ Read at the Concord School of Philosophy, August 3, 1881.